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RIPARIAN AND OTHER RIGHTS IN NON-NAVIGABLE
WATERS.
THm decisions on navigable lakes and rivers, which have been
rendered since the last edition of Angell on Watercourses, have
been reviewed by the author of the present article, in a former
number of this periodical: ante, p. 147.
It is now intended to consider the cases decided during the same
period which relate to unnavigable waters flowing naturally, as well
as those that pertain to certain artificial streams, as canals and
ditches, which may be either of a navigable or unnavigable capacity.
In these cases are embraced five kinds of waters, of which four are
unnavigable and flow naturally, and one artificial, and either navi-
gable or non-navigable. The law, then, of these cases may be
conveniently divided into five parts, viz. : first, LAKES; secondly,
STREAMS; thirdly, CANALS, or ARTIFICIAL STREAMS; fourthly,
SURFACE WATER; and fifthly, UNDERGROUND WATER.
I. LAKES. It is well settled in the United States that a riparian
owner of land on a navigable lake does not own any part of the
bed. On a non-navigable lake, however, the rule is different; and
the owner of such a lake, lying within the United States survey,
takes the bed of the lake ad medium flium aquae ex adverao : .Ridg-
way v. Ludlow, 58 Ind. 248.
In Mackenzie v. Bankes, Law Rep. 3 App. Cas. 1324, it appeared
that by the Scotch law the proprietors of land bordering on a lake
had the right of fishing, fowling and boating on the lake. M. was
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a riparian proprietor on Loch F, and B. owned all the land on
Loch D. These lakes were about eight miles in length, and were
separated from each other by a shallow and narrow channel (not a
river) over which, about forty years since, had been erected a cause-
way of loose stones. The proprietors held cum lacubus only. It
was contended on the argument that the two lochs constituted but
one lake, and, consequently, as M. owned land on Loch F, he had
the right to fish, &c., in the entire body of the water of the two lochs.
The court held, however (Lord BLACKBURN doubting), that the
lochs were distinct lakes, the grounds of the decision being chiefly
the difference of name and existence of the causeway; and that as
M. owned no land on Loch D, he had not any rights over that sheet
of water.
II. STREAMS. The rights that a man has over water flowing
through his land may conveniently be ascertained by seeing (1),
how far a man may use the waters of a stream on his ground, and
then considering his other rights under the following heads: (2)
Diversion of water; (3) Detention of water; (4) Pollution; (5)
Right to erect and tear down obstructions in the stream; (6) Ser-
vitudes; (7) Overflow; (8) Ice.
Before considering these rights, however, we shall first define the
terms "shore, " and "watercourse.
"
A watercourse is, where water flows in a certain direction,
through a regular channel, with fixed bed and banks, the flow of
which is defined, but not always continuous: Morrison v. Railroad
b., 67 Me. 353.
A river's shore is the land adjacent to the water-line, and not
merely that thread of land touched by the water, and the word is
used in that general sense in which the same term is popularly ap-
plied to the land adjacent to the water of an inland sea, or to one
of our great interior lakes; per WOODWARD, J. : Lacy v. 
Green,
84 Penn. St. 514.
Thus in the preceding case, the court held, that where one had
reserved the." right of occupying the pond and shore * * * 
for
the purpose of securing his lumber," he had the right to pile his
lumber on the land adjacent to the river.
Every man, through whose land a stream flows, is entitled to that
flow without diminution or obstruction: Shamleffer v. Mill Co., 
18
Kans. 24; and to such use of the water as shall not injure any pro-
prietor, above or below, on the stream: Williamson v. Canal Co.,
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76 N. 0. 478. This right is property: M3yer v. Whitaker, 55
How. Pr. Rep. 376; and passes by conveyance with the land:
Slhamleffer v. Mill Co., supra.
Since water is property, it may not only be used and consumed,
in reasonable quantities, but it may also be conveyed: alyer v.
Whitaker, supra. It is to be noted, however, that the conveyanLe
of water falling over a dam is construed strictly, with regard to the
amount of water: as where the terms of the conveyance were,
that no dam "shall be built so high as to overflow the springs,"
&c., it was held that, though the water was to be used for manu.
facturing purposes, the grantee could not overflow the springs.
although without such overflow the conveyance would be of no use:
Salado College v. Davis, 47 Texas 181: but the construction is
liberal with regard to the kind of use contemplated.
Tius in Hathaway v. Mitchell, 34 Mich. 164, there was a con-
veyance of a right to maintain a dam at a specific height, with no
restrictions on the kind of use, and it was held that the use ought
not to be confined to that then presently contemplated, and that it
made no difference what kind of mill the water was used for.
So in Atlanta Mills v. Mlason, 120 Mass. 244, a deed reserved
for a mill estate, all the water that could be drawn through the
waste-gate, when the water ran over a rolling dam, and it was held
that the reservation was general, and that it was of no consequence
for what purpose the water was used, or whether it was used at
all.
And so in Merrill v. Calklins, 74 N. Y. 1, the grant of such a
quantity of water as should be necessary for a tannery, was con
sidered not to be a limitation of the use, but merely a criterion of
the quantity; and finally in Doan v. Metcalf, 46 Iowa 120, the
"right to use the water to the amount of the wheel, now in use,"
was considered to mean 3ne wheel, or if the aggregate amount were
the same, any number of wheels.
Water being actual property, it follows also that no one can be
deprived of the rightful enjoyment of it without compensation.
gut he must prove an actual injury to himself, impresenti, or in
reversion.
Thus in Dwight v. City of Boston, 122 Mass. 583, the court
held that the taking of the water (by statute) "of all the water"
of a river, "for the purpose of furnishing a supply of pure water
to the city" above a dam, was not such taking as would allow an
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action for damages to lie at the instance of any one whose land laj
above the dam, in the absence of actual injury. But in Lund v.
New Bedford, 121 Mass. 286, where a city was withdrawing large
quantities of water, in the possession of tenants, under a claim of
right, it was held that the owner could maintain an action for the
injury to his reversion without alleging present actual damage.
2. A man has further the right to divert the water of a stream
without asking the permission of the proprietors above or below,
provided he returns the water to its natural channel before leaving
his land, and does not obstruct its course (-Ewing v. Colquhoun, Law
Rep. 2 App. Cas. 839), or at least does not obstruct its course mate-
rially: Pettibone v. Smith, 37 Mich. 579. He cannot, however,
divert the stream to another's injury (Porter v. Durham, 74 N. C.
769); but he niay force the water back in an upper owner's race-
way, provided he does not obstruct such owner's wheel: Brown v.
Dean, 123 Mass. 254.
It is of no consequence how the waters of a watercourse may
have originated, for if they come within the definition above given,
an action for diversion will lie. Thus in BuIrich v. Riuhter, 41
Wis. 318, it was held that an action lay for the diversion of water,
which had not originated in a spring, but had flowed long enough
in a certain direction to have acquired a defined bed and banks,
though it was. at times dry; and so in Williamson v. Canal Co..
supra, it was held that the owner of a mill, who drew his water
supply from a stream originating in a swamp, might maintain an
action against a company for draining the swamp and stopping his
supply of water. But, quixre, in this case, whether the character
of the place where the stream originated was not notice, that some
day the swamp might be drained, and whether the mill-owner did
not take only till that day.
Lord PENZANCE thought that where one diverts for his own con-
venience the course of a stream, and constructs an artificial water-
course, he is bound to "construct it in such a manner that it will
be capable of conveying off the water that might possibly flow into
it from all such floods and rain falls as might happen in the local-
ity: Fletcher v. Smith, Law Rep. 2 App. Cas. 781.
How far an action for diversion will lie at the hands of the par-
ties who acquire the land after the diversion has taken place, may
be seen from the following cases:
In Shamleffer v. Mill Co., supra, defendants dug a channel from
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a river over the land of an upper riparian proprietor, and returned
it again into the stream below the land of a lower owner, thus cut-
ting off somewhat the supply of the intermediate owner, who was
a minor. A. afterwards purchased the intermediate tract, and
brought an action for diversion. Held, defendants had no right to
divert the water in the first place. Held further, that the fact of
the defendants doing this openly, and expending large sums of
money upon the work, would not estop the plaintiff, because defend
ants knew the grantor was a minor, and his guardian could not
dispose of his land without an order of court, and consequently A.
had a right of action.
In Chap~man v. Copeland, 55 Miss. 476, B.'s grantee brought
an action for the diversion of a stream by a ditch, which A. had
dug on B.'s land. Held, B.'s grantee having suffered damage after
purchase, was entitled to recover, whether A. had done anything to
the ditch after purchase or not.
In Atlanta Hfills v. Hason, supra, the owner of an upper and
lower mill privilege appropriated to the latter all the water that
could be conducted thither by the tail-race of the former. The
purchasers of the upper estate opened a trench through the lower
estate, the owner objecting, and diverted the water from the tail.
race. Held, the grantee of the purchasers of the lower estate
could object to this diversion, whether they knew of the existence
of the trench when they bought the estate or not.
3. The owner of a dam on a non-navigable stream has the right
to detain so much water as is necessary to propel his machinery,
though he inconvenience a lower owner, provided he does not
thereby deprive him of his just quantity of water. Thus in Bul-
lard v. Manf. Co., 20 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 43, the water falling over a
dam was only sufficient to propel the machinery of the upper owner
at full seasons, who thereupon closed the gates of the dam and suf-
fered the water to accumulate during the night, and stopped
thereby the works of a lower owner, who ran his works day and
night, and it was held, that the lower owner, not having shown
fhat he was deplived of his rightful quota of water, an action by
him would not lie for detention.
4. No one has the right to pollute the waters of a stream in the
absence of grant or prescription: Dwight v. City of Boston, 122
Mass. 583.
S. purchased land in the coal regions and built thereon a hand-
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some residence. One of the inducements to his building was a pure
spring of water running through his land. Two miles above his
property, a mine was opened and so operated as to pollute the
waters of the spring by the mineral flow from the mine: Held, S.
had a right of action; Sanderson v. Bailroad Co., 86 Penn. St.
401.
5. A man may build on the bed of an unnavigable river on his
own land, nor will he be prevented from so doing unless at the in-
stance of some one whose property is injured thereby: *per Lord
BLACKBURN, Ewlflng V. OJlqzLhoun, &uzpra. Thus the mere erec-
tion of a dam, where there is no overflow, is not a ground of
action: Schoff v. Imp. Go., 57 N. H. 113; nor will the mere
speculation, that a man's land when covered by water may some
day be used as a water-way, be sufficient to prevent him from
building upon it: per Lord BLACKBURN, Ewing V. Colquhoun,
supra. But no one else besides the riparian owner can obstruct
the stream. Thus in Bottoms v. Brewer, 54 Alabama 288, it was
held that a statute conferring the right to divert water, or obstruct
a stream by a dam, was authorizing the taking away of private
property_ as much as if lands were taken away, and was in conse-
quence not constitutional.
One, however, who illegally obstructs a stream leaves himself
open to an action. Thus the obstruction of a race-way is a wrong
in se, and the obstructor is not entitled to notice before suit is
brought: Lawson v. Price, 45 Md. 123; and so in Bloomer v.
Morss, 68 N. Y. 623, where the defendant filled up a race-way,
which was part of the natural channel of the stream, which plain-
tiff had deepened, the court held that defendant's act was illegal;
that if the channel was wrongfully deepened, defendant had always
a remedy, but that now plaintiff had an action against him for
filling up the channel.
Where, however, a man causes an illegal obstruction, he has
still a right of action against another for a similar wrong. This
principle was laid down practically in the preceding case. Also in
Clarke v. French, 122 Mass. 419, the court held that a mill-owner
partially obstructing the stream was not precluded from recovering
from another mill-owner who also obstructs the stream.
So in Brown v. -Dean, supra, the court asserted the same prin-
ciple and said the principle of contributory negligence did not
apply.
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One may also tear down any natural obstruction in a stream
running through his land. As where a company had dug a chan-
nel into a river, and diverted the water for the purposes of their
mill, and there 'was a natural obstruction in the stream below the
channel-head, on the land of another, which backed the water of
the river and flooded the channel, the court held that, in the ab-
sence of any servitude being shown, the owner of the land could
tear down the obstruction in the stream: Shamleffer v. Mill Co.,
supra.
6. Where a servitude is acquired on land it may be exercised up
to its full capacity or not, at the pleasure of the owner, and he
cannot be deprived of it, but by his own act, or omission to act.
Thus in Maguire v. Baker, 57 Ga. 109, land was sold in sepa-
rate tracts, upon one of which was a mill and dam, in a leaky and
dilapidated state, and the court held, that the servitude still con-
tinued up to the capacity of the dam, when new, and the owner
might either repair the old dam or erect a new one, and run it up
to its full capacity.
A servitude may be acquired in different ways, and among others
by prescription or adverse user, and by estoppel. TALCOTT, J.,
said: Where it is gained by prescription, the right must be com-
mensurate with the extent of the previous enjoyment, for the man-
iter of using the water of a stream cannot be materially varied to
the injury of others on the stream, unless the manner of the
changed use has been the same continually for a long period of
years: Prentice v. Geiger, 16 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 350.
The right to overflow land like easements in general may be ac-
quired by an uninterrupted and adverse enjoyment for twenty years;
i. e. the statutory period: Vail v, Mix, 74 Ill. 127.
Thus where one had backed, by a dam, the water of a stream,
flowing through the land of both, on to his neighbor's land for fifty
years, it was held that he had a vested right to do so, and to re-
build the dam: Ogle v. Dill, 55 Ind. 130.
In JT2tteson v. Wilbur, 11 R. I. 545, complainant took a mill
estate "together with a privilege to build and repair a trench * * *
with six-tenths of the water appertaining to said premises," i. e., of
the premises of complainant and respondent. Complainant's land
was bounded by a stream, and on the stream, wholly on defendant's
land, was a dam. The trench was built and kept in repair by both.
Complainant drew a water supply from the dam-pond, for forty
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years, and on the defendant's attempting to tear down the dam and
build one higher up the stream, the effect of which would be to stop
complainant's mill, complainant filed a bill for an injunction. De-
fendant contended that the dam was wholly within his premises,
and that he had the right to use it or tear it down ; that six-tenths of
water meant merely so much water from the river. The court, held,
however, that as complainant had used the water of the dam for
forty years, and as he had openly done so, and had paid for the
trench, &c., with the defendant, he had acquired a servitude. Fur-
ther, that six-tenths of the water, meant so much water-power of
the dam, as otherwise the deed would be useless, for complainant
had always, as a riparian owner, the right to use the river; and,
this was further evident from the fact, that unless this power were
given, the works of the complainant must stand still.
In Barber v. Nye, 65 N. Y. 211, A. conveyed land to B., with
the privilege, if it should be necessary for his mill, to erect a dam
on other land of A. to enable the grantee to get the "best possible
use of the water." A dam was built on A.'s land, which becoming
dilapidated, was pulled down and a new one erected on B.'s land,
which raised the water no higher than before. Held, no action lay
against B., for though the height of the old dam might determine
the flowage, its destruction did not terminate that right, and the
court said, it was proper to exhaust all means to raise water on B.'s
land before going on to land of A.
Where one stands quietly by and acquiesces in the laying out of
expenditures and erection of a dam, he will not be allowed to en-
join the rebuilding of the dam: Vail v. Mix, supra. But where
one possesses a mill-dam for seven years under color of right with-
out its having been overflowed, owing to the defective condition of
the dam, he will not have his land relieved of such servitude in the
absence of the owner's intention to abandon his right to use the
dam to its full extent: Maguire v. Baker, supra.
7. A spring boiling up from the bottom of a creek is overflowed
though it issue with sufficient force to rise above the level of the
creek, and so when the spring is covered by the backed waters of
a dam: Salado College v. Davis, 8upra.
In Marcy v. Fries, 18 Kans. 853, it was held that where an
action was brought for the overflow of a dam, the general benefits
resulting to the vicinity from the presence of the mill, could not
be used as a set-off to reduce the damages caused by the overflow,
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where the mill was of no particular advantage to the proprietor,
whose land was overflowed.
8. To the owner of the bed of a stream belongs also the water, as
ice. This is, however, an absolute property, and may be disposed of
as the timber on one's land: 31yer v. Whitaker, supra.
In the preceding case, A. owned all the land under a pond exeept
a small portion belonging to B. A. acquired from B. the right to
overflow this portion, and conveyed to 0. its ice, which should be
found on this pond. A freshet occurred, which loosened the ice,
and would have swept it away but for C.'s effort in mooring it. D.
entered with B.'s permission over land belonging to B., and cut the
ice. Held, the title to the ice was in the grantee of A. Held,
jurther, that as C.'s efforts alone saved the ice, he had sufficient title
from that alone to recover from D.
In Hikey v. Hazard, 3 Mo. App. 480, it was held that, where
one had marked off and staked ice, unappropriated by any one, on
a navigable river, and had expended money to preserve it, he had
a sufficient title to support an action for trespass.
IIL CANALS or ARTIFICIAL STREAMS. Where one constructs an
artificial watercourse, it is incumbent on him to make it sufficiently
strong to carry off the freshets to which the vicinity is subject.
Thus in Burbank v. Ditch Co., 13 Nevada 431, defendants
constructed a canal, which thus received the waters of a stream, that
otherwise would have emptied into the river. The waters of the
stream were raised by a freshet, and there being no waste-gate to
the canal, its walls were burst, and the country flooded. Held, it
was negligence in defendants not to have a waste-gate, when the
canal was not sufficiently strong to carry off the waters raised
by an ordinary freshet. The court, however, did not say what
the law would have been, if the freshet had been of an extraordinary
character. See Fletcher v. Smith, supra.
Where one stores water on his own land, and uses reasonable
care, he will not be held liable for an escape of water caused by the
act of God, vi8 major, &c., though if it had been anticipated it
might have been prevented:. Niclwl8 v. Aarsland, 2 Law Rep. Ex.
Div. 1.
Reynolde v. ffo8mer, 51 Cal. 205, presents such an interesting
case on canals and liens that it has been thought worth insertion.
The history of the case is as follows:
By a statute of California it is provided that all contractors, &c.,
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"furnishing materials for * * * the construction of any * * *
flume or aqueduct shall have a lien upon the structure, * * * to the
extent of the labor done or materials furnished, or both." A canal
was built, and several years afterwards extended several miles by a
different contractor. The Supreme Court of the United States, in
Canal Co. v. Gordon, 6 Wall. 561, held that the lien did not extend
to the whole structure, but held the sections to be two structures,
and that the lien extended only to the (lower) section built by the
contractor. FIELD, GRIER and MILLER, JJ., dissented. This
lien was sold, and A. obtained possession of the lower section of
the canal. The owner of the upper section cut off all the supply
of water from the lower section. The court in California (ffosmer
v. Reynolds, supra), held that as the Supreme Court had decided
as they had, that court was bound to follow them and say that no
action lay for this diversion of the water, for the two sections being
held to be two structures, and there being no servitude upon the
upper by the lower, the upper owner could do what he pleased with
the water in his section. In this case WALLACE, C. J., said he
simply followed the United States Court, and his associates gave no
opinion. The fact of the above-named justices dissenting, and the
California court and the, Circuit Court of the United States enter-
taining a different opinion from that expressed in the decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States, would raise great
doubt as to the soundness of the decision, did not the facts of the
case itself show pretty conclusively its unsoundness. Perhaps also
the decision of the lower court might be questioned upon other
grounds, but we have too small space to note the case further.
One who constructs a ditch or small canal, under the Act of
Congress of 26th July 1866, across the public lands of the United
States, will not be held responsible therefor by any subsequent pur-
chaser of the lands: Shoemaker v. Hatch, 18 Nev. 261.
The long enjoyment of one ditch raises no presumption of a
grant to use another ditch differing appreciably in locality or dimen-
sions: Porter v. Durham, supra.
IV. The law relating to surface water is not always uniform in the
United States. In some of the states it has been held that water
coming naturally from a higher estate must be received on the
lower, while in others the courts have said that the owner of the
lower estate cannot be obliged to receive it on his land, but may
back it on to the land of the upper owner.
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In 3Morrison v. Railroad Co., 8upra, a railway company built over
B.'s land, obstructed by its bed a flow of surface water and backed
it, causing thereby damage to B.'s house. Held, B. could not re-
cover for such obstruction.
In 1M'u:phy v. Kelley, 68 Maine 521, plaintiff's drain carried
the water on to defendant's land, on which plaintiff had no ease-
ment. Held, plaintiff had no action against defendant for stopping
the drain on his own land and backing the water on plaintiff's
land.
In Limerick's Appeal, 80 Penn. St. 427, two of three drains,
which carried the water off a turnpike, were stopped up, and an
excessive flow in consequence took place over the land, adjacent to
the road : Held, the owner of the land overflowed had a right to dam
the water off his land, no matter how the water got on the road.
But in Porter v. Durham, supra, the court said that an owner
of land is obliged-to receive surface water on his land ; but the
upper owner can not artificially increase the natural quantity of the
water, nor discharge it on a lower owner in a manner different
from its natural discharge.
In Williamson v. Canal Co., supra, it was held that where a
canal company drains a swamp, from which issues a stream of
water, that supplies a mill, it must show that the company's char-
ter was obtained prior to the building of the mill.
V. A man has the right to use subterranean water percolating
through the soil, as he pleases, in his own land, even though he
disturbs another's enjoyment of the same on his land.
Thus in Wilson v. Waddell, Law Rep. 2 App. Cas. 95, it was held
that where mineral workings have caused a subsidence of the surface,
and a consequent flow of rainfall into adjacent lower coal-fields, the
injuries, being from gravitation and percolation, are not a ground
of action.
So in Phelps v. Nowlen, 72 N. Y. 39, it was held, one may
lower the sides of a well on his own premises, though merely to
injure another's supply of water.
One can, however, recover for injury occasioned by backed water
percolating through the soil and rendering his ground swampy:
Mfarsh v. Trullinger, 6 Oregon 356.
In 7ohnstown Manf. Co. v. F'eghte, 69 N. Y. 16, land was con-
veyed to plaintiffs' with right to use springs on said land, and in
case such supply was insufficient to take water from springs on
